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Really Statistical Explanations
and Genetic DriftMarc Lange*yReally statistical ðRSÞ explanation is a hitherto neglected form of noncausal scientific
explanation. Explanations in population biology that appeal to drift are RS explanations.
An RS explanation supplies a kind of understanding that a causal explanation of the
same result cannot supply. Roughly speaking, an RS explanation shows the result to be
mere statistical fallout.
1. Introduction. I argue that really statistical ðRSÞ explanation is a hitherto
neglected form of scientific explanation and that, in particular, explanations
in populationbiology that appeal to drift ða.k.a. “genetic drift,” “randomdrift”Þ
are RS explanations. RS explanations are noncausal, in contrast to many other
familiar scientific explanations ðincluding explanations in population biology
appealing to selection for some traitÞ. That some fact has an RS explanation
does not preclude its having a causal explanation. But an RS explanation sup-
plies a kind of understanding that a causal explanation of the same result
cannot supply. Roughly speaking, an RS explanation shows the result to be
mere statistical fallout—that is, just a statistical fact of life.
In section 2, I will introduce RS explanations and contrast them with
causal explanations. I will supply several examples of important kinds of RS
explanations. In section 3, I will argue that explanations appealing to drift
are RS explanations. I will contrast my conception of drift explanations withReceived December 2012; revised February 2013.
*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of North
Carolina, CB 3125, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125; e-mail: mlange@email.unc.edu.
yThanks to Chris Haufe, Alex Rosenberg, and participants at Philosophy of Biology a
Madison ð2012Þ, Andrea Woody’s seminar on scientific explanation at the University o
Washington ð2011Þ, and the British Society for the Philosophy of Science Special Seminar on
Choice and Explanation ðOxford, 2012Þ.
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f
several rival conceptions in the recent literature. On my view, drift is not
distinguished from selection by constituting a distinct kind of causal process.
170 MARC LANGEBut explanations by drift are sharply distinguished from selectionist ex-
planations since drift explanations are noncausal. Selection and drift in-
volve different kinds of explanations, not different kinds of causal pro-
cesses.
2. RS Explanations. Why in my class did the students with the lowest
scores on the first exam tend not to be the students with the lowest scores on
the second exam? The explanation could have been that the first exam’s
worst performers dropped the course before the second exam. The expla-
nation could instead have been that the first exam’s worst performers were
frightened into working harder and consequently did somewhat better on
the second exam. But often neither of these happened. Rather, the explana-
tion is “regression toward the mean.”
How does this explanation work? Suppose there is a statistical relation
rather than a perfect correlation between two variables—for example, the
outcomes of two tests. Insofar as one student scored lower than another on
the first test, the former student likely ðbut not certainlyÞ scored lower on the
second test. In any such case, extreme scores in one variable tend to be
associated with less extreme scores in the other variable ðso there tends to
be “regression toward the mean” from the extremesÞ. Accordingly, just as
students who did worst on the first exam tend not to do worst on the second
exam, so for the same reason students who did best on the first exam tend
not to do best on the second exam. This explanation does not propose that
the first exam’s best performers were complacent in preparing for the sec-
ond exam. Rather, this explanation portrays the result being explained as
just ðin the words of one textbookÞ “a statistical fact of life” ðGravetter and
Wallnau 2009, 536Þ.
Of course, any phenomenon explained by regression toward the mean can
also be explained by the particular causes that were responsible for moving
various individuals toward the mean. Perhaps one student who did worst on
the first exam happened to receive several questions on the second exam
concerning a topic she understood; another student may have gotten luckier
with her guesses on the second exam; perhaps a third was hampered by
sickness during the first exam but not the second. This explanation treats the
students individually, whereas regression toward the mean proceeds at the
level of the population as a whole. Furthermore, regression toward the mean
unites the best first-exam performers with the worst, supplying a common
explanation of both groups’ fates on the second exam—unlike an explana-
tion that describes separately the causes at work on each student. Similarly,
regression toward the mean unites the case of the second exam with other
cases that can receive the same kind of explanation, such as the less ex-This content downloaded from 152.2.205.125 on Fri, 17 May 2013 16:54:47 PM
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ceptional heights of children who have exceptionally tall or short parents—
Galton’s ð1886Þ original example of regression toward themean. These cases
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 171plainly cannot be given the same sort of explanation in terms of the sepa-
rate causes acting on the individuals involved.
The explanations describing the separate causes influencing various in-
dividuals may themselves be statistical explanations. For instance, suppose
a fair coin is tossed 100,000 times; consider the various runs of 20 con-
secutive tosses beginning with toss numbers 1, 11, 21, . . . . Neighboring
runs share 10 tosses, so a run with more than 10 heads tends to be followed
by another run with more than 10 heads. Nevertheless, a run with an ex-
ceptionally high number of heads tends to be followed by a run with fewer
heads. This result could be explained by regression toward the mean. Al-
ternatively, it could be explained by the coin’s 50% chance of landing heads
on any given toss ðindependently of the outcomes of other tossesÞ: we could
compute the chance that a run with an exceptionally high number of heads
will be followed by a run with fewer heads and find the chance to be high
ðe.g., the chance that a run of 20 heads will be followed by a run with fewer
heads is just the chance of at least one tails appearing in 10 tosses, which is
12 ð:5Þ10 5 1; 023=1; 024Þ.
These two explanations are both “statistical.” However, they are funda-
mentally dissimilar. The explanation that does not appeal to regression to-
ward themean is causal, whereas the regression explanation is not—in a sense
that is commonly used to distinguish causal from noncausal explanations.
Let’s look at this distinction carefully.
The nonregression explanation appeals to the coin’s fairness—that is, to the
propensity of the coin ðtogether with the coin-tossing mechanism and back-
ground conditionsÞ to produce a “heads” outcome. This propensity is a ðnon-
surefireÞdisposition. Philosophers differ on whether dispositions themselves
qualify as causes of their manifestations.1 But whether or not a disposition
is a cause of its manifestation, an explanation of some result that works
by characterizing the result as manifesting some disposition is causal in the
broad sense that it derives its explanatory power from describing relevant
features of the result’s causal history or, more broadly, of the world’s network
of causal relations.2 For this reason, Lewis ð1986, 220Þ says that a causal ex-
planation is given when the question “Why was the CIA agent there when1. The orthodox view ðPrior, Pargetter, and Jackson 1982Þ is that a disposition does not
help to cause its manifestation. Sober ð1984, 77–78 and 84Þ and Shapiro and Sober
ð2007, 253Þ see this view as the wrong conclusion to draw fromMolieresque “dormitive
virtue” considerations.
2. Jackson and Pettit ð1992, 10Þ make a similar claim. An explanation appealing to an
omission may likewise be causal even if omissions are not causes ðsince they are not
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His Excellency dropped dead?” is answered by “Just coincidence, believe
it or not.” Despite identifying no causes, this explanation is causal because
172 MARC LANGEit explains by virtue of describing relevant features of the result’s causal his-
tory. In this case, the relevant feature is that the causes of the CIA agent’s
presence in the country at that time have nothing relevant in common ðsuch
as a plotÞ with the causes of His Excellency’s death. ðThey have in common
the big bang and the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere above the coun-
try, but neither of these is relevant in the given context.Þ Notice that an
explanation need not describe the result’s actual causal history in order to
qualify as causal, as long as it explains by virtue of supplying relevant in-
formation regarding the world’s network of causal relations. For instance,
Jackson and Pettit ð1992Þ correctly say that the water’s boiling in the flask
explains the flask’s cracking by virtue of the fact that had the given col-
lision between a water molecule and the flask not occurred ðor not caused
a crack to formÞ, another collision would almost certainly have done so. The
preempted “cause” did not cause the cracking, and so information about it
does not describe the crack’s actual causal history. But information about
it explains by virtue of describing the world’s causal network ðtelling us what
that network would have been like, had it been different in a certain wayÞ.
That is, information about the preempted “cause” ðwhich we learn by being
told that the water is boilingÞ describes the causes at work in ðactual or hy-
potheticalÞ cases like the given case.
Consider the above explanation of the coin-toss result that does not
appeal to regression toward the mean. It is causal in that it works by de-
scribing the relevant features of the result’s causal history: the chance of any
toss’s landing heads and the way those chances combine to yield the chance
that an extreme run will be followed by a less extreme one. Since this ex-
planation is causal, it could be deepened by being supplemented with de-
scriptions of the causal factors responsible for giving the setup a 50% chance
of yielding heads, such as the coin’s mass distribution and the coin-tossing
mechanism.
In contrast, the explanation by regression to the mean is not causal. It
depicts the result as fallout from the statistical character of the case—not
from the 50% chance of a toss’s landing heads, not even from the chances of
a 10-toss run’s having various numbers of heads, but rather from the mere
fact that there is a statistical association between the outcomes of over-
lapping 20-toss runs. This explanation is not deepened by being supple-
mented with descriptions of the coin or the tossing mechanism. These facts
have no place in the explanation since the explanation does not derive its
eventsÞ; such an explanation may work by describing the outcome’s causal history.
This is Brandon’s ð2006, 321Þ reason for characterizing an explanation appealing to
omissions as “causal” even though it cites no causes.
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power to explain from its describing relevant features of the result’s causal
history. The point of the explanation is instead to exhibit the result as aris-
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 173ing from the fact that successive runs have a statistical relation—regardless of
that precise relation or its ðperhaps probabilisticÞ causes or, indeed, whether
it has any causes at all.3
Accordingly, I call explanations of this kind “really statistical” ðRSÞ ex-
planations. An RS explanation does not proceed from the particular chances
of various results—or even from the fact that some result’s chance is high
ðor lowÞ. It exploits merely the fact that some process is chancy, and so an RS
explanation shows the result to be just “a statistical fact of life.”4
There are many kinds of noncausal explanations; not all are RS.5 For
instance, that Mother has 23 strawberries and three children explains why
Mother failed to distribute her strawberries evenly ðwithout cutting anyÞ
among her children. What makes this explanation noncausal is not that
it fails to cite causes; the numbers of children and strawberries happen to
be causes of Mother’s failure. What makes it noncausal is that it does not
work by describing the outcome’s causes ðor the world’s causal networkÞ.
In this explanation, Mother’s having three children helps to explain Moth-
er’s failure not by being one of its causes, but by helping to make her suc-
cess mathematically impossible ðLange, forthcomingÞ.
This noncausal explanation is not RS. But just as this explanation is
noncausal despite supplying information about causes, so an RS explana-
tion may happen to supply information about causes. In the coin-toss case,
what makes the regression explanation noncausal is neither its failure to ex-
ploit the coin’s 50% chance of landing heads nor its invoking only something
less specific ðthat there is a statistical association between the outcomes of
overlapping 20-toss runsÞ; after all, the explanation of the flask’s cracking
is causal despite appealing only to the water’s boiling, not to a specific mo-
lecular collision. What makes the regression explanation noncausal is that
3. In some contexts, the question “Why did the students who did worst on the first exam
tend not to do worst on the second exam?” is understood to be demanding a particular
kind of explanation: one appealing to causes common to many of the students. Then the
correct reply is to reject the question as having a false presupposition ðthat there is such a
causeÞ. But the fact that regression toward the mean fails to answer the why question in
such a context does not show that it is never an answer; the why question may lack this
presupposition.
4. Statistics textbooks commonly present regression toward the mean as answering why
questions, such as “Explain why the rookie of the year in major-league baseball usually
does not perform as well in his second season” ðGravetter and Wallnau 2009, 536Þ.
Lipton ð2009, 622Þ is the only philosopher I know who has mentioned explanations that
appeal to regression toward the mean.
5. Possible varieties of noncausal scientific explanations include structural explanations
ðHughes 1989, 256–57Þ, dimensional explanations ðLange 2009aÞ, mathematical expla-
nations ðColyvan 1998, 321–22Þ, and explanations by symmetries ðLange 2009bÞ.
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the explainer ðthat there is a statistical association between the outcomes
of overlapping 20-toss runsÞ acquires its power so to explain other than by
174 MARC LANGEvirtue of supplying information about causes. The explanation succeeds
whether or not any causal relations generate the statistical association.
Not all RS explanations exploit regression toward the mean. For exam-
ple, Rutherford and Geiger set out to explain why it is that “in counting the
a particles emitted from radioactive substances . . . the average number
of particles ½emitted from a steady source is nearly constant, when a large
number is counted, ½but the number appearing in a given short interval is
subject to wide fluctuations. . . . For example, during a considerable inter-
val it may happen that no a particle appears; then follows a group of a par-
ticles in rapid succession; then an occasional a particle, and so on” ð1910,
698Þ.6 Rutherford and Geiger concluded that the departures from the mean
in various intervals—and the fact that these departures tend to be smaller
in longer intervals—are explained by “the laws of probability and that the
a particles are emitted at random” ð704Þ rather than, “for example, that the
emission of an a particle ½precipitates the disintegration of neighboring
atoms” ð698Þ. Once again, that this explanation is RS rather than causal is
reflected in the fact that it would not have been deepened by being supple-
mented with an account of the causal factors responsible for the radioactive
sample’s rate of a-particle emission. The explanation does not appeal to
whether each atom in the sample has the same chance of undergoing ra-
dioactive decay. ðThey do not; the sample was a mixture of many polonium
isotopes.Þ The explanation does not appeal to whether a given sample’s
activity depends on its temperature ðit does notÞ. The explanation does not
even appeal to whether different polonium samples have the same chance
of a-particle emission. It appeals simply to a given sample’s having a con-
stant chance of emission during the experiment ðhowever, that fact is to be
explainedÞ and then uses the “laws of probability” to explain the depar-
tures from the mean number of decays ðand those departures’ tendency to be
greater as the intervals became brieferÞ.
Of course, to explain why a given sample has a constant chance of
emission, we must appeal to various causal factors concerning the sample’s
physical constitution ðas well as various natural lawsÞ. But the fact that an
RS explanation appeals to a fact that itself has only a causal explanation
does not make the RS explanation covertly causal. A scientific explanation
is not responsible for explaining the facts in its own explanans ðHempel
2001Þ. Admittedly, the relevant “law of probability” applies to a radioactive
sample only because of the sample’s physical constitution, which accounts
for its constant chance of emission. But the RS explanation does not appeal
to that physical constitution since the RS explanation does not explain why
6. Thanks to Chris Haufe for calling this article to my attention.This content downloaded from 152.2.205.125 on Fri, 17 May 2013 16:54:47 PM
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the law of probability applies. Rather, the RS explanation simply appeals to
the law’s applicability ðin this case, the constant chance of radioactive
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 175emissionÞ and applies the law.
In short, Rutherford and Geiger explained the departures from the mean
as mere artifacts of the statistics. A causal explanation that begins with the
half-lives of various polonium isotopes and their proportions in the sample,
and then deduces the likelihoods of various numbers of emissions over var-
ious intervals, would also explain the observed result.7 But all of this infor-
mation about the result’s causal history is beside the point when the point
is to show that the result reflects the fact that the emission process is statis-
tical, whatever the specific half-lives, proportions, and other causal details
may be. This RS explanation unifies the radioactive-decay case with other
cases involving fundamentally dissimilar causal mechanisms. The reason
why Rutherford and Geiger recorded different numbers of emissions dur-
ing different 10-minute periods is the same kind as the reason why different
runs of 20 consecutive tosses of a fair coin resulted in different numbers of
heads—and in both cases, there is also the same kind of reason why longer
runs tend to give results closer to the mean rate. Notice that an RS explana-
tion does not have to show that the phenomenon to be explained is certain
or even likely given merely that it arises from a statistical process. An RS
explanation can explain why a particular run of the experiment yielded a
result extremely far from the mean value. The RS explanation is, in effect,
that “it’s just statistics.”8
However, an RS explanation says a good deal more about the ex-
planandum than merely that “it’s just statistics.” An RS explanation iden-
tifies the explanandum as an instance of some particular kind of behavior
that is characteristic of statistical systems in virtue of their being statisti-
cal. For instance, the RS explanation of the fact that the students with the
lowest scores on the first exam tend not to be the students with the lowest
scores on the second exam is that the explanandum is an instance of re-
gression toward the mean. The RS explanation of the fact that 10 of a given
7. Noncausal explanations do not preclude causal explanations, as Salmon ð1989,
181–84Þ emphasizes. However, some philosophers who have described explanations
that I would characterize as RS may disagree. For instance, regarding an explanation of
why samples’ departures from expectation are more likely as samples become smaller,
Walsh ð2007, 284, cf. 288–89Þ says that “the effect is explained by the statistical prop-
erties of the setup and not by the causal properties of the apples” ðin this case, the
weights of the various apples in the populationsÞ.
8. Some such slogan is quite common. For instance, consider Galton’s discovery that
over those cases in which the two parents’ mean height is between 70 and 71 inches
ðaverage human height was 68.2 inchesÞ, the mean children’s height is 69.5 inches. The
RS explanation in terms of regression toward the mean shows that “this is a statistical,
not a genetic phenomenon” ðBland and Altman 1994, 1499Þ.
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philosophy department’s 15 graduate applicants accepted their offer of ad-
mission—a much higher rate than in previous years—might be that it is a
176 MARC LANGEstatistical fluke: when a statistical process is run many times, an occasional
runmay have a result quite far from the mean value. An RS explanation does
not have to deem the explanandum to be likely given the explanans, but it
must identify some particular signature of statistical processes that the ex-
planandum exemplifies.
Some signatures have well-known names, such as “regression toward the
mean,” but others do not. There is no moniker for the fluctuations ðobserved
by Rutherford and GeigerÞ in the frequencies of various outcomes in runs
of repetitions of a given experiment, or for the considerable departures of
some of these frequencies from their mean values, or for the tendency of
departures from the mean value to diminish as the runs lengthen. Neverthe-
less, all of these familiar behaviors are characteristic of runs of independent,
identically distributed trials; the runs exhibit these features solely by virtue
of their statistical character ðregardless of its causal basis, if anyÞ. These be-
haviors can thus receive RS explanations.9
RS explanations are especially illuminating when the phenomenon being
explained does not initially appear to be merely a matter of statistics. For
example, suppose that for 20 successive days, two students are given a
different problem to solve daily, where the first student to solve the day’s
problem will win one point. The student in the lead at the end of the 20-
round contest will win a prize. Suppose we run this contest for many pairs
of students, and in more than half of the contests, there is one student who is
either never in the lead or in the lead just once. It would be tempting to
conclude that this is because students who fall behind early tend to lose
heart and slacken off or because in every contest, one student is much more
talented than the other. But the correct explanation may in fact be that the
outcome of the contest is the product of a “random walk.” Regardless of the
difference between the two students’ abilities ði.e., between their chances of
winning a point in any roundÞ—even if there is no difference between their
abilities—it is more likely than not that one student will be behind in the
contest only once or never, when a given student’s chance of winning a
9. Of course, the RS reason why a run of 200 coin tosses has only 20 heads ðwhere the
mean outcome is 100 headsÞ is the same as the RS reason why a run of 200 coin tosses
has only 5 heads: such wild fluctuations occasionally happen with runs of independent,
identically distributed trials. That both outcomes receive the same RS explanation should
not disturb us. It has long been widely ðalthough not universallyÞ accepted that different
outcomes can receive the very same causal statistical explanation. For instance, if Jones
contracts paresis, then the considerations responsible for Jones’s likelihood of con-
tracting paresis ðsuch as his having latent untreated syphilisÞ will explain why he does,
and if Jones does not contract paresis, then the same considerations will explain why he
does not ðSalmon 1989, 62Þ. I see no reason why different possible outcomes cannot
likewise receive the same RS explanation.
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given round is the same in every round.10 Surprisingly, this “one-sidedness”
is a characteristic feature of random walks.11 To explain the result as the
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 177product of a random walk is like explaining some phenomenon as a case of
regression toward the mean. Both explain the result as a characteristic kind
of statistical fallout.
The RS explanation of the improvement in the scores of the worst-
performing students does not say merely that this improvement was just “a
statistical fact of life.” It goes on to identify the result as a case of regression
toward the mean in particular. Thus, the RS explanation does not say merely
that the result has no causal explanation appealing to some cause common to
many of the students. Rather, it supplies a genuine explanation by identi-
fying the particular signature of statistical processes that the explanandum
exemplifies. That is why RS explanations are characterized in science ðsee
n. 4Þ as answering why questions, not merely as rejecting some.
An RS explanation may proceed without appealing to any laws of na-
ture—unlike statistical explanations that require laws to associate a given
setup with various chances of yielding various possible outcomes. An RS
explanation does not appeal to the particular propensities at work but merely
to the fact that there are chances. Consequently, instead of subsuming the re-
sult to be explained under a statistical law of nature, an RS explanation ex-
ploits a theorem of the probability calculus ðwhat Rutherford and Geiger
called “the laws of probability”Þ.12
An RS explanation does not proceed by the brute-force approach of put-
ting everything in and computing everything out ðas in the nonregression
explanation of the coin-toss resultÞ—that is, by calculating the chance of the
result being explained from more basic chances ðe.g., the chance of a toss’s
landing “heads”Þ, after perhaps inferring those chances from the setup con-
ditions ðe.g., the coin’smass distributionÞ and the natural laws bywhich those
conditions are associated with some propensities. Rather, an explanation is
RS if and only if it works by identifying the result being explained as an
instance of some characteristically statistical phenomenon such as regression
10. In the most evenly matched case ði.e., when each student has a 50% chance of win-
ning any given roundÞ, the chance that one player will be in the lead only once or never is
0.5379 ðFeller 1957, 79Þ.
11. The RS explanation does not have to include the mathematical derivation showing
this “one-sidedness” to be a characteristic feature of random walks. The RS explanation
appeals merely to the fact that it is such a feature. Similarly, I argue ðLange, forthcomingÞ
that “distinctively mathematical” explanations in science ðsuch as the explanation I gave
of Mother’s failure to distribute the strawberries evenlyÞ include mathematical facts but
not their proofs.
12. Of course, an RS explanation does not appeal solely to mathematical necessities. It is
a contingent fact that a given system is statistical—e.g., that the students’ scores on the
two exams are correlated statistically.
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toward the mean, departure from the expectation value, or the one-sidedness
of random walks. Their working in this way distinguishes RS explanations
178 MARC LANGEfrom causal explanations and is responsible for the other features setting RS
explanations apart ðsuch as their exploiting theorems of the probability cal-
culus in place of natural lawsÞ. Whereas the brute-force approach can be
applied to explain any result of statistical processes, an RS explanation exists
only when the phenomenon to be explained arises from the mere fact that
statistical processes are at work.
3. Drift. Population biology calls on drift to explain many kinds of phe-
nomena. It explains why the frequencies of various traits ðor genotypes or
genesÞ in a given population experiencing no mutations, migration, or se-
lection pressure nevertheless change over time. It explains why a popula-
tion’s frequencies depart from their expectation values ðwhich reflect the
selection pressure on the populationÞ and why these departures tend to be
greater for smaller populations. It explains why different populations of the
same size, with the same initial frequencies, and experiencing the same se-
lection pressures ðand no mutations or migrationsÞ nevertheless have dif-
ferent frequencies at the end of a given period—and why these differences
tend to be greater for smaller populations. Drift explains all of these results
as “just statistics”—that is, as “sampling error” ðwhether drift enters the pic-
ture when certain organisms but not others become parents, or certain gam-
etes but not others from a given parent contribute to a zygote, or in some
other wayÞ. Explanations by drift are RS explanations.13
To see how this characterization of drift explanations can help us to
understand them better, I briefly contrast my view with some of the other
ways that drift explanations have recently been characterized. It might ini-
tially appear that “drift” refers to all and only departures of a population’s
frequencies from their expectation values. However, it is commonly noted
ðe.g., Beatty 1992, 36; Plutynski 2007Þ that if drift consists of such de-
partures, then drift cannot explain these departures ðas population biologists
call on it to doÞ. Accordingly, some philosophers identify drift as the pro-
pensities of a population to have frequencies departing to various degrees
from their expectation values: “In a finite series of trials, there is a spread of
possible outcomes, each with its own probability. Drift is simply the un-
certainty associated with this spread of possibilities” ðMatthen 2009, 484Þ.
13. Matthen ð2009Þ has recently proposed that statistically abstractive ðSAÞ explanation
is a hitherto neglected form of explanation and that explanations by drift are SA ex-
planations. An SA explanation is not an RS explanation. Rather, it is a statistical ex-
planation of the usual sort, its only distinction being that it derives the chance of the fact
being explained by placing the case in a reference class that is not objectively homo-
geneous. In doing so, it ignores certain statistically relevant factors on the grounds that
they are uninteresting to a particular theory in play ðsuch as population geneticsÞ.
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On this view, the ground ði.e., the disposition’s “categorical base” or
“causal basis”Þ for the propensities associated with drift is no different from
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 179the ground for the propensities associated with natural selection. Indeed,
drift and selection are not distinct causal processes, and an explanation ap-
pealing to drift is no different from an explanation appealing to selection—
except for the kind of outcome being explained: “Drift explains what natural
selection cannot in the sense that drift accounts for those differences between
the actual outcome of a series of births, deaths, and reproductions and the
outcome predicted by differences in trait fitness” ðWalsh, Lewens, and Ariew
2002, 465Þ. “Natural selection and drift are not distinct processes working
on a finite population, but mathematically connected aspects of the same
accumulation” ðMatthen 2009, 484Þ. On this view, neither drift nor selec-
tion for some trait is a causal process. Drift consists just of the chances for
various frequencies to depart to various degrees from their expectation val-
ues through births and deaths resulting from various separate processes af-
fecting individual organisms.
Many philosophers ðe.g., Millstein 2006; Shapiro and Sober 2007Þ
have criticized this view as failing to recognize selection for some trait as
a unified causal process acting on a population as a whole—in other words,
for failing to understand that “selection for is the causal concept par ex-
cellence” ðSober 1984, 100Þ.14 ðAs we will see, these critics generally regard
drift and natural selection as distinct causal processes.ÞMore relevant to our
concern with drift is that the view expressed byMatthen,Walsh, et al. fails to
account for those cases in which drift explains a phenomenon that does not
consist of a departure from expectation values. For example, consider a
population in which some rare, widespread catastrophe ðe.g., an epidemicÞ
wipes out many individuals and “selects” without regard to their heritable
traits but leaves the population with the same frequencies as before—
14. To defend this view properly would take me too far afield. I do wish to note, however,
that selection for some trait is a causal process ðas Shapiro and Sober ½2007, 256 call it in
a passage I quote shortlyÞ, not a cause. In selection, various features of the population
undergoing selection and of its environment are causes of the outcome frequencies. Se-
lection ðlike diffusion, erosion, heat flow, and electrical conductionÞ is a process involv-
ing population-level causes and effects, the result being that certain traits are “selected”
over others so that a new set of trait frequencies is the effect that is explained ðjust as
temperature differences are causes in the process of heat flow, with a new spatial dis-
tribution of heat as the effect to be explained, and potential differences are causes in
electrical current flow, pressure differences in diffusion, and so forthÞ. To say that “se-
lection for properties causes differences in survival and reproductive success” ðSober
1984, 100Þ is to specify the causal process at work, not to say that selection is a cause in
place of or alongside these features of the population and environment. This can easily
lead to confusion. To cite one example, McLaughlin ð2007, 279–80Þ interprets Sober’s
remark above as mistakenly treating selection as a cause and then goes on to insist that
selection “just is ðnonaccidental, differentialÞ reproductive success.”
This content downloaded from 152.2.205.125 on Fri, 17 May 2013 16:54:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
namely, with frequencies coinciding with their expectation values. Popula-
tion biologists would attribute the outcome ðincluding the population crash
180 MARC LANGEand the resulting frequenciesÞ to drift. This explanation by drift is an RS
explanation: the occurrence of such a catastrophe ðlike a period of excep-
tionally frequent a-particle emission from Rutherford and Geiger’s radio-
active sampleÞ is just a statistical fluke that is virtually bound to happen from
time to time in the long run. Of course, the outcome also has a causal
explanation—namely, that an epidemic struck the population—and there are
even causal explanations of why certain individuals but not others were
victims ðalthough these causal explanations are not selectionist since dif-
ferences in heritable traits made no difference to which creatures survived
the catastropheÞ.
Let me give another kind of example in which drift explains a phenom-
enon that does not consist entirely of a population’s departure from ex-
pectations. Consider two populations of the same ðfiniteÞ size and with the
same initial frequencies that are experiencing the same selection pressures
ðand no mutations or migrationsÞ. Suppose they have different frequencies
at the end of a given period: one has frequencies coinciding with their ex-
pectation values and the other has frequencies departing from their expec-
tation values. Population biologists would attribute this difference to drift;
that is, they would hold drift responsible for explaining why the two pop-
ulations’ frequencies diverged despite their having the same initial condi-
tions and their experiencing the same selection pressures. The same expla-
nation would apply whether both populations’ frequencies departed from
their expectation values or only one population’s did; drift explains their di-
vergence.
The drift explanation is that such variation is characteristic of statistical
processes ðas Rutherford and Geiger also emphasizedÞ. It is an RS expla-
nation. It is not the case that one population in the pair was acted on by se-
lection and the other by drift. Both are subject to the same selection pres-
sures. Indeed, the outcome could be explained by drift or by those selection
pressures ðsince the selection pressures, like a coin’s propensity for landing
heads, do not determine an outcomeÞ. But an RS explanation is noncausal,
whereas an explanation in terms of what is being selected for is causal. A
selectionist explanation describes the ground of the propensities for various
frequencies and so explains by virtue of supplying information regarding the
sorts of causes at work in cases with the initial frequencies of and selection
pressures on these two populations. By contrast, the RS explanation in terms
of drift identifies the result being explained as the same sort of typically
chancy behavior as Rutherford and Geiger noted their radioactive source
exhibiting: considerable fluctuations in short periods. Thus, in interpreting
drift explanations as not appealing to some sort of causal process, I agreeThis content downloaded from 152.2.205.125 on Fri, 17 May 2013 16:54:47 PM
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with Matthen, Walsh, et al.—but without agreeing with them that selection
for some trait is likewise not a causal process. On my view, a selectionist
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 181explanation of the two populations’ divergence is like a causal explanation
of why runs of 20 coin tosses with an exceptional frequency of heads tend
to be followed by less exceptional runs—namely, an explanation that be-
gins by describing the causal basis of the 50% chance of any toss’s landing
heads. In contrast, an explanation by drift is like an explanation of the coin-
toss outcome as regression toward the mean.
Here is another example in which ðcontrary toMatthen,Walsh, et al.Þ drift
is invoked to explain a result that does not consist just of a population’s
departure from expectation values. Consider a population under constant
selection pressure with frequencies that in the short run depart from their
expectation values but in the long run largely coincide with their expecta-
tion values. Again, drift explains this behavior—but not because drift ex-
plains only the short-run result ði.e., only the departures from expectationÞ.
Rather, an RS explanation appealing to drift explains the difference between
the short- and long-run results as characteristic of statistical processes. ðRuth-
erford and Geiger observed this feature, too.Þ This drift explanation can-
not be accommodated by the view that “a series of births, survivals, deaths,
and reproductions manifests drift just if the outcome—measured as changes
in trait frequencies—diverges from that predicted by differences in fitness”
ðWalsh et al. 2002, 459Þ. Note the “just if.”
Of course, this outcome can also be explained causally: in terms of the
selection pressure. As we have seen, RS explanations and causal explana-
tions work differently and respond to different interests that we may have in
asking “Why?” As I understand it, a population biologist who wants to
know whether the difference between the population’s short-run and long-
run frequencies is a matter of drift or a matter of selection is asking whether
the selection pressure early in the period under study was different from the
selection pressure during the rest of the period. She is asking about causes.
But she is not presenting drift as a possible causal explanation—a rival to
selection for some trait. Rather, in asking whether the difference between
the short-run and the long-run results is explained by drift or selection, she
is asking whether this difference has an RS explanation by drift or whether
some difference in selection pressure accounts for the difference in fre-
quencies. These are rivals, whereas a causal explanation for the population’s
short- and long-run frequencies that appeals to various unchanging selec-
tion pressures is compatible with an RS explanation by drift for the dif-
ference between these frequencies.15
15. Compare “it was drift, not selection” to “this is a statistical, not a genetic phenom-
enon” quoted in n. 8.
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Suppose the answer to the population biologist’s “Drift or selection?”
question regarding the difference between the population’s short- and long-
182 MARC LANGErun frequencies is “Drift, since the degree of selective advantage afforded by
various traits was unchanged throughout the period.” This answer plainly
does not require that no trait have been selected for during the period. This
drift explanation fails to accord with the idea championed byMillstein ð2002;
cf. Hodge 1987, 252–53Þ that drift always consists of a sampling process
that is indiscriminate ðin that heritable physical differences are causally ir-
relevant to differences in reproductive successÞ. Of course, the distinction be-
tween discriminate and indiscriminate sampling is genuine, and some phe-
nomena explained by drift result from indiscriminate sampling ðas in the
epidemic exampleÞ. However, as many philosophers have noted ðe.g., Bran-
don 2005; Matthen 2009, 467Þ, a product of discriminate sampling can also
be explained by drift. For example, as I mentioned, drift explains why two
populations of the same size, with the same initial frequencies, and expe-
riencing the same selection pressures ðand no mutations or migrationsÞ have
different frequencies at the end of some period. Another example of drift
with discriminate sampling is Beatty’s famous case ð1984, 195Þ in which
dark moths in a given period are eaten by predators disproportionately be-
cause, although trees with dark bark are more common than light trees and
consequently dark moths are fitter than light, “the dark moths chanced to
land on light trees more frequently than on dark trees,” whereas the light
moths landed on a representative sample of trees. The sampling here is dis-
criminate since predators are more likely to eat moths that contrast with their
backgrounds.16 On my view, the outcome in this period has an RS explana-
tion in terms of drift because it constitutes just the sort of fluctuation that
is characteristic of statistical processes. It also can be given a causal expla-
nation in terms of the selection pressure—or, more deeply, in terms of the
setup’s physical features that are responsible for the selection pressure ðe.g.,
that 60% of the trees have dark barkÞ.
Of course, some paradigm instances of drift are cases of indiscrimi-
nate sampling, as Millstein emphasizes. For example, according to Kimura’s
“neutral theory of molecular evolution,” “the overwhelming majority of evo-
lutionary changes at the molecular level ½result from random fixation ðdue
to random sampling drift in finite populationsÞ of selectively neutral ði.e.,
selectively equivalentÞmutants” ð1991, 367Þ. Onmy view, once again, when
16. By adding another population of moths in which both light and dark moths hap-
pened to land on representative samples of trees, we could turn Beatty’s example into my
earlier example involving two populations with the same initial frequencies under the
same selection pressures but with frequencies that have diverged by the end of a given
interval.
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drift explains the fixation of some selectively neutral mutant, the explana-
tion is RS because it identifies the result as just the sort of fluctuation that
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 183is characteristic of statistical processes. ðThe explanation thus characterizes
the fluctuation as akin to a period in which Rutherford and Geiger’s radio-
active sample undergoes an extreme rate of a-particle emission. Recall that
the explanans in an RS explanation need not make the explanandum likely.Þ
The result would still involve this sort of fluctuation even if the mutant were
very slightly deleterious, for example. However, on Millstein’s view, the re-
sult would then not be the product of drift at all since sampling would be
discriminate rather than indiscriminate. I agree with Brandon ð2005Þ that dis-
criminate sampling does not differ qualitatively from indiscriminate sam-
pling. Accordingly, drift explanations should be available in either case.
One motivation for Millstein’s identification of drift with indiscriminate
sampling ðand selection with discriminate samplingÞ is that otherwise, it is
difficult to see how drift and selection can be distinct kinds of population-
level causal processes. Accordingly, Brandon ð2005, 167Þ concludes that
“there is a single process, sampling,” and so “the outcome, deviation or lack
thereof from expectation, is a necessary component of our concepts of drift
and selection,” respectively. But I have already argued that drift need not be
associatedwith departure from expectation values. Shapiro and Sober ð2007Þ
suggest that drift and selection are distinct population-level causal processes
ðjust as Millstein saysÞ but that ðcontrary to MillsteinÞ drift does not require
indiscriminate sampling. Rather, drift occurs whenever a population has a
finite effective size ð255Þ. What, then, sets drift apart from selection? Sha-
piro and Sober say: “We view selection and drift as distinct processes whose
magnitudes are represented by distinct population parameters ðfitnesses on
the one hand, effective population size on the otherÞ. Changes in each of
these parameters will be associated with changes in the probabilities of dif-
ferent outcomes. If you intervene on fitness values while holding fixed pop-
ulation size, this will be associated with a change in the probability of dif-
ferent trait frequencies in the next generation. And the same is true if you
intervene on population size and hold fixed the fitnesses” ð256Þ.
In short, according to Shapiro and Sober, even if drift cannot be eliminated
from a population undergoing selection, drift remains distinct from selection.
Drift, unlike selection, is stronger insofar as population size is smaller. Ab-
rams agrees: “drift and selection are distinct causal factors because they can
be independently manipulated by changing, respectively, population size
and fitness differences” ð2009, 667Þ. Several other philosophers ðe.g., Reis-
man and Forber 2005Þ have joined Shapiro and Sober in arguing that since
population size can be manipulated to yield predictable differences in the
chances of various frequencies, drift is a causal process. In addition to manip-
ulability, some philosophers ðe.g., Millstein 2006, 632Þ have also appealedThis content downloaded from 152.2.205.125 on Fri, 17 May 2013 16:54:47 PM
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to counterfactual dependence and probability raising as signs of causal re-
lations. On all of these grounds, philosophers have argued that in drift, “the
184 MARC LANGEsize of the population can be said to play a causal role” ð631Þ and so that drift
is a causal process distinct from selection.17
A fundamental problem with these arguments is that the explanatory
power of effective population size in drift explanations is mediated not by
any laws of nature, butmerely by the “laws of probability”—that is, bymath.18
No causal law is responsible for making greater departures from expecta-
tion values more likely as population size diminishes. Given the chances
of various possible outcomes on any particular independent trial, the rela-
tion between population size and the likelihoods of various population-wide
outcomes is not contingent.19 For all of its manipulationist, counterfactual-
dependence, and probability-raising credentials, population size does not
act as a population-level cause in drift explanations since these credentials
are mathematically necessary, not beholden to anymere law of nature.20 This
feature of drift explanations fits well with their interpretation as RS expla-
nations since RS explanations employ theorems of the probability calculus
in place of statistical laws of nature.
17. Sober ðpersonal communicationÞ currently believes that drift and selection are not
distinct causal processes; rather, there is only one population-level causal process at
work. However, drift and selection involve different causes co-occurring ðpopulation size
and fitness differences, respectivelyÞ that jointly influence the trait frequencies, just as in
a series of coin tosses, there is only one causal process by which heads and tails are
accumulating, but the coin’s bias and the number of tosses are distinct causes, separately
manipulable.
18. There are other problems with these arguments, too. In some cases, selection is
stronger insofar as population size is smaller ðsee Sober 2001Þ.
19. The relevant theorem of the probability calculus is that in n independent trials where
the chance of a given kind of outcome in any given trial is p, the chance of i such out-
comes is ½n!=i!ðn2 iÞ!pið12 pÞn2i.
20. However, Sober ð2011Þ believes that although the fitnesses of various traits in a
population stand in metaphysically necessary connections to the traits’ expected
frequencies, they are causes of those frequencies; no contingent law of nature is needed to
mediate between a cause and its effect. ðThis may not represent a departure from Sober’s
prior view of fitnesses as “causally inert” ½1984 since Sober there was arguing tha
fitnesses are not causes of the survival and reproduction of individual organisms; he did
not address whether they are causes of trait frequencies in a population.Þ Sober ð2011Þ
gives manipulationist reasons for thinking fitness to be a cause of trait frequency, and he
says that a contingent law is not needed to mediate a causal relation because ðappealing
to DavidsonÞ it is an analytic truth that E’s cause would cause E ði.e., if E occurs and has a
cause, then E’s cause caused EÞ. However ðI replyÞ, this truth’s analyticity does not show
that a causal relation requires no contingent law to connect cause and effect since “con
tingent” here should be contrasted with “metaphysically necessary” ða modal matterÞ, no
with “analytic” ða conceptual matterÞ. Although “E’s cause”may be analytically connected
to “E,” it does not follow that the event that is E’s cause is connected to E by metaphysi
cal necessity. In contrast, that trait A is fitter than trait B is connected with metaphysica
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Sober ð1984, 115Þ says that coin tossing “affords the same distinction” as
selection versus drift, revealing why they are distinct causal processes. Just
REALLY STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS AND GENETIC DRIFT 185as selection cannot occur without drift, so a coin flipped with some chance
of landing heads must be flipped some definite number of times. Never-
theless, the distinction remains: “Two coins may have the same chance of
landing heads but may be tossed a different number of times. Two other
coins may be tossed the same number of times but may differ in their
chances of landing heads. The first two coins have something in common,
and so do the second” ð115Þ. Of course, this last remark is correct. But I
do not think that the coin example shows drift and selection to be distinct
causal processes any more than a series of coin tosses consists of several
causal processes running simultaneously.
The coin-toss example also illustrates my claim that the number of coin
tosses is not a cause of the resulting frequency of heads because no con-
tingent law of nature gives it its alleged “causal role.” Suppose we aim to
explain why the coin’s percentage departures from its expected frequency of
heads have generally been greater in runs of 50 tosses than in runs of 50,000
tosses. We could explain this fact by the brute-force approach of using the
coin’s chance of landing heads on an individual toss to compute the chances
of various great departures from the frequency’s expectation value in runs of
50 and 50,000 tosses. We could deepen this causal explanation by replacing
the propensity with its ground in the setup, including the coin’s mass dis-
tribution and the tossing mechanism. Then the explanation would require
laws of nature to associate this setup with a propensity for ðfor exampleÞ a
head. These are causal explanations. But the role in these explanations
played by the number of coin tosses in the run ðwhich enters after a law has
associated the setup with a toss’s chance of yielding a headÞ is beholden not
to any mere law of nature but entirely to a theorem of the probability calcu-
lus. The run’s length is thus not a cause.21
necessity to a relation among A’s and B’s expected frequencies. That connection holds21. Walsh ð2007Þ has also recently argued that the number of tosses is not a cause.
Here is his argument, as I understand it. Consider 100 fair coin flips resulting in roughly
50% heads, although in the 10 runs of 10 successive flips each, there were significant
departures from 50% heads. Why is that? A drift explanation appeals to 10 flips being
much smaller than 100 flips. But if the number of flips is a cause, then ðWalsh saysÞ we
would have to say that drift as a cause is strong in each subpopulation but weak in the
in virtue of what fitnesses essentially are, whereas the event that is E’s cause is not es-
sentially so. Furthermore, I do not see how fitness’s manipulationist credentials do any-
thing to undermine Sober’s previous ð1984Þ argument that fitness is a mere actuarial
property reflecting various potential causal factors that may not actually have come into
play and so is unsuited to being a cause. That argument, in my view, precludes fitnesses
from being causes even of trait frequencies. ðOf course, I agree with Sober ½1984 that
fitness can still figure in causal explanations since it can describe the world’s causal rela-
tions without figuring in any itself.Þ For more, see Lange and Rosenberg ð2011Þ.
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Suppose an explanation instead sets aside the coin’s particular chance of
landing heads on an individual toss as well as the fact that we are dealing
186 MARC LANGEwith runs of 50 and 50,000 tosses—and even that we are dealing with coin
tossing in particular. The explanation then proceeds not by describing rel-
evant features of the outcome’s causal history, but rather by characterizing
the fact being explained as an instance of a general, characteristic feature of
statistical processes: outcomes are more likely to adhere more closely to
expectation values in the longer than in the shorter run. This explanation is
noncausal; it computes no chances regarding the case at hand; it is mediated
not by any ordinary laws of nature, but rather by a theorem of probability.
This is the kind of explanation that drift supplies.22
On my view, one instance of drift may involve indiscriminate selection
ðone kind of causal processÞ, whereas another instance involves discrimi-
nate selection ða causal process of another kindÞ. Drift is not distinguished
from selection by constituting a distinct kind of causal process. But ex-
planations by drift are sharply distinguished from selectionist explanations
since drift explanations are noncausal. That, in every case of drift, some
population-level causal process is at work does not entail that there is some
distinct kind of population-level causal process that constitutes drift or that
a drift explanation is a causal explanation. What is distinctive about drift,
I have suggested, is not the outcome or the causal process but the kind of
noncausal explanation it supplies.22. That an explanation by drift cites no causes does not entail that it is not a causa
explanation. Brandon ð2006, 329Þ says that drift explanations are causal precisely because
they describe what happens by default—i.e., in the absence of causes making it happen
otherwise ðsee n. 2Þ. I have argued that drift explanations are noncausal because they are
RS, not because they cite no causes.
population as a whole—which is a “contradiction” ð296Þ since the 100-flip population
is composed of the 10 subpopulations. However, I see no contradiction in taking the
number of tosses as a cause: that there were only 10 tosses could be a cause of the
outcome for a given subpopulation but plainly is not supposed to be a cause of wha
happens in the overall population. Walsh generates a contradiction only by turning the
number of tosses into the strength of a “force”: drift is weak for the overall population
but strong in each subpopulation, which is a contradiction ð“drift is objectively both
weak and strong in the population” ½296Þ considering that the overall population
comprises the subpopulations. But without treating drift as a force ðas philosophers
sometimes do metaphoricallyÞ acting on each subpopulation ðand perforce the overal
populationÞ, Walsh generates no contradiction; at least, I see no contradiction arising
simply from n5 10 being a cause for a subpopulation but n5 100 being a cause for the
population as a whole. ðMatthen ½2009, 409 gives an argument similar to Walsh’s
“How can strong nondirectional ðand therefore noncancellingÞ forces operating on parts
of a population give rise to a weak force operating on the whole?”Þ
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